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INTRODUCTION

Portfolio managers are charged with maximizing return for a given level of
risk. There are practical problems that arise in creating an efficient portfolio and
maintaining a target level of risk and return. This paper will identify two important
factors that a manager needs to address in creating and managing a portfolio. The first
step in creating a portfolio should be the establishment of the structure of the portfolio
or the portfolio policy, what asset classes it holds and in what proportions. The
structure of the portfolio is the main factor that shows how a portfolio is exposed to
risk. A second important factor is the strategy employed by the manager to manage the
portfolio. A manager can choose to employ a buy and hold strategy or he/she can take
a more active role by employing some form of a rebalancing strategy. 1 The portion of
return generated by employing a particular strategy will be attributed to active
management. We build a regression model that will answer the question what percent
of the total return is explained by the portfolio policy vs. active management?
However, to implement a solid portfolio structure and management strategy,
the manager must first understand the historical correlation of risk and return among
various asset classes. Historical returns are examined and show that they differ over
the same time period; thus managers must understand how different combinations of
assets within a portfolio produce different risk-return tradeoffs. Second, the manager
must understand the importance of asset allocation and how it affects total portfolio
return. The importance of asset allocation is closely examined and compared with the
portion of return added by active management. Third, the manger must lmderstand the
I

Different rebalancing strategies and their effect on total return will be discussed in details.
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theoretical and mathematical framework behind the portfolio creation. Both the
systematic and unsystematic risks are discussed and how diversification eliminates the
unsystematic risk associated with the assets
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.

The results of the regression models show that on average, the portfolio policy
(or the portfolio structure) accounts for 73.4% of a portfolio's total return. In addition
once the portfolio policy has been determined, Active Management, on average,
accounts for only 1.27% of the variation of total return.

HISTORICAL RETURNS OF DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES

Fortunately the stock market is probably the best recorded event in human
history and the data for every major and minor index, stocks, and bonds is plentiful.
Therefore, an examination of the historical returns is necessary to understand, not only
the returns of different asset classes over the decades, but also how these assets
respond to different market environments. As we will see later in this paper, an
understanding of how different assets are correlated together, as well as their historical
risk/return patters will be crucial in creating efficient portfolios and efficient
management techniques.
While past data cannot be used to accurately predict the future returns of
different asset classes, it is a starting point in understanding asset class and market
behavior. Most of the following data that will be presented are cited from the work of

2 Appendix A provides a theoretical and mathematical framework for answering some of the most

important questions related to portfolio creation. Are the characteristics of a portfolio (standard
deviation and return), the same as its individual components? Why does diversification lower risk?
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Jeremy Siegel, "Equity Premium: Stock and Bond Returns Since 1802" which was
first published in Financial Analyst Journal, February 1992.
Figure 1. illustrates the historical returns of different asset classes, the value of one
dollar initial investment with all income (dividends, capital gains or coupons)
reinvested is given in for the peliod 1802-1990.
Figure 1.
The Value of 51 Invested: 1802 through 1990
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The graph shows the real and nominal return of stocks, long and short term
government bonds, both before and after taxes. It is clear that stocks yield a higher
return than bonds. The geometric average nominal returns for the 1802-1990, for
stocks is 7.6% annually ( real return is 6.2% annually). The average nominal return for
long term government bonds is 4.7% annually ( real return is 3.4% annually). Finally,
the nominal return for short term government bonds is 4.3% annually ( real return is
2.9% annually) . Therefore, it is possible to conclude that stocks have a higher return
than bonds over long periods of time.
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However, to get a better understanding of the behavior of these asset classes it
is necessary to look at their historical risk pattern. The standard deviation of returns
from their mean is usually used to measure the risk of a given asset. The following
chart shows the standard deviation (risk) of stocks and bonds over the period 18021990.
Figure 2.

Standard Deviation of Returns
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From the chart it is clear that stocks are riskier than government bonds. Also, long
term government bonds are riskier than short term ones. Using the above observations
we can come to the conclusion that the riskier an asset the higher the return required to
invest in the asset. The historical data confirms the fact that stocks are riskier than
bonds and therefore stocks will yield higher returns than bonds over long periods of
time. Usually, most investors will hold more than a single stock or bond. Any
combination of the same asset class or different asset classes creates a portfolio.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSET ALLOCATION
The structure of the portfolio (or the portfolio policy), given by its asset
allocation and the weighting of each asset within the class, is the main factor that
shows how a portfolio is exposed to risk. Since the weighting of each asset within the
different asset classes, is set in advance by the portfolio policy, the return from the
policy does not come as result of active management, it is a passive return. The
portion of return from policy, can easily be captured using a passive index whose
components have the same weighting as that of the portfolio policy. As shown in
appendix A, risk and return are highly correlated and taking on additional risk
enhances the expected portfolio return. The expected return of a portfolio composed of
50/50 stocks/treasury bills, is very different from the expected return of a portfolio of
90/1 0 stocks/treasury bills because the difference in the weighting of the asset classes
with result in different risk exposure of the portfolio. However, is asset allocation the
only factor that determines the portfolio returns?
A simple observation would be that if asset allocation accounts for 100% of
portfolio returns then why do investors need to hire a money manager to make buy/sell
decisions? Why would an investor be concerned about security selection? Therefore, a
reasonable assumption would be that the expected level of return of a portfolio is
determined by two main factors: asset allocation, and active return, which depends on
security selection and the ability of the manager to overweight/underweight assets
within the asset classes.

7
Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000), have introduced a model that isolates the portion
of return contributed to asset allocation and to active management. They express the
total return of the portfolio as follows:

TRit

= (1 + PRit)(l + ARit) -

1.

Where TRit represents the total return, PRit gives policy return, and ARit active return
of fund i in period t.

To answer the question what percent of portfolio return is

explained by the policy return, Ibbotson and Kaplan, examined 10 years of monthly
returns of 94 U.S. balanced mutual funds and 5 years of quarterly returns of 58
pension funds.
The percent of fund return explained by policy return was calculated as the
ratio of annualized policy return divided by the total fund return 3 . The success of an
individual manager is indicated by a policy to-total-return ratio of less than 100 · %,
indicating that policy return was not the only factor in detem1ining total return. While
failure of a manager to add value is signaled by a ratio greater than 100 percent,
indicating that the active portion of the return was negative. Table 1 shows the results
of the study.
Table 1.
Average Percent of Total Return Explained by Policy Return:
Mutual Funds Pension Funds

3

Average

104%

99 %

Median
Risk-Adjusted Average

100 %
123%

99 %
110%

Risk-Adjusted Median

100%

99%

Where TRi

=

PRi + ARi
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On average for both Mutual and Pension Funds, policy accounted for a little more than
100% of the total return. The data reveals some differences between the performance
of mutual funds and pension funds. On average 99% of the returns from Pension
Funds are explained by investment policy. However, as noted by Ibbotson and Kaplan,
the Pension Fund data did not account for investment expenses (management fees) . If
the data did include these expenses than the result would have been on average closer
to 100% of the total return is explained by investment policy. On the other hand, the
Mutual Fund data shows that on average 104% of total return is explained by
investment policy. This result shows that on average active management is in fact
deteriorating the performance of the mutual funds from their benchmark. Since on
average 104% of the total return is explained by investment policy then the portion
attributable to active management is at least -4% of the total return. Therefore, ·on
average managers, of both mutual and pension funds are failing to add additional
value to their portfolios beyond the portfolio benchmark.
However, these results do not show that active management has no merit in
realizing additional return on their portfolios. The results do show that on average the
manager fails to add additional return to their portfolios. As table 2 shows there are a
few managers(top 5 percent) that contribute as much as 18% of the total return to their
portfolios. The percentage of contribution by managers can be as high as 24% of the
total return when calculated on a risk adjusted basis. Therefore, investors who are able
to select superior managers do in fact have the potential to earn above average returns.
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Table 2.
Range of% of Total Return Expl ain ed by Policy RetW11

I

Unadjusted for Risk

Risk

Adjusted
Percentile

MutualFund

95 (worst)
75
50
25
5 (best)

132 %
112 %
100 %
94 %
82 %

Pension Fund
11 3%
102%
99%
96%
88%

MutualFund

161%
126%
11 0%
97%
76%

Pension Fund
139 %
109 %
99 %
92%
76 %

To have a better appreciation of how active management can influence the total return
of funds , it is necessary to compare the total rehtm of different funds against each
other. This kind of analysis will answer the question what percent of the variation in

return among funds does asset allocation(policy) explain and what percent of the
variation in return among funds is attributable to active management?
For consistency purposes the same data set as above is used in a cross-sectional
analysis. The compound annual total returns TRi, and the compound annual policy
returns, for the 10 years of monthly data, are used for the cross-sectional regression
model. The R2 statistic for this model showed that 40% percent of the variation in
returns among funds can be explained by their asset allocation policy. For the pension
funds only 35% of the variation in returns can be explained by their asset allocation
policy. Therefore the other 60% of the variation in returns among funds is attributed to
active management which includes components like security selection, and asset class
timing. This finding reinforces the fact that asset allocation policy explains a sizable
portion of the variation in returns among funds and also it shows that active
management plays a very important role in explaining return variation among different
funds.
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Therefore, the two most important roles of a fund manager are to determine the
portfolio structure, its investment policy, and to find efficient ways of managing the
portfolio in order to create above average returns. In order for the manager to
formulate an efficient investment policy, he/she should have a very good
understanding of the risk/reward characteristics of the different asset classes. As it was
shown above in the section on Historical RisklReturn Patterns of Different Asset
Classes and in Appendix A, there is a risk/reward trade off for all investment assets.
Therefore, a practical problem that the managers need to address is to find the proper
asset mix that would maximizing return while minimizing risk.
This problem is at the heart of the modem financial theory and many different
models have been created to explain the trade offs between asset allocation, risk and
return. One such model is the efficient frontier of the risk/return combination. The
efficient frontier is a curve in the risk-return space that gives all the possible
combinations of assets in a portfolio that will maximize return while minimizing risk.
Like other models, the efficient frontier has some constraints. The simpler version of
an efficient frontier assumes no short sales of assets. The following graph will
illustrate how the efficient frontier looks for a portfolio consisting of only two indexes:
the S&P 500 and EAFE, using actual annual return and risk for the period 1973-19944 .

4

The EAFE is an international stock index, representing Europe, Australia and the Far East.
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Figure 4.
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The curve shows the return/risk combinations if the investor used different weighting
on these two indexes. Each point on the curve will maximize return for a given level
of risk. The EAFE index has on average yielded a higher return than the S&P500 for
the period 1973-1994. However, the increased return comes at the expense of higher
risk. The investor is faced with three choices; first he/she can invest all the money in
the S&P500, expecting lower risk and lower return. As seen from the figure, if all the
money is invested in the S&P500, the maximum annual return would be around
10.75%. The second choice is to invest all the money in the EAFE, which has a higher
risk and higher expected return. As seen from the figure, if all the money is invested in
the EAFE, the maximum annual return would be around 12.6%. The third option is to
diversify between the two indexes, and allocate a portion of the money to each index.
Therefore an investor should move along the efficient frontier by selecting the
appropriate mix, given his level of risk tolerance.
A second model which identifies the relationship between risk and return was
created by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French in their paper "The Cross-Section of
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Expected Stock Returns". They tested several variables that could explain differences
in returns. These variables included company size, leverage, price/earnings, price/cash
flow, and price/book. The data set used in the study covered the period from 19631990, for all the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.
Their work showed that all these factors relate to returns. Two of the factors, however,
seemed to do the job of all the factors together, specifically, company size and
book/market price variables. Based on this work, Fama-French introduced the Three
Factor Model, which takes a different approach to explain the sources of risk in the
market than Markowitz's Efficient Frontier approach. They found that investors are
concerned about several different risks factors rather than just one( the standard
deviations of retun1s). But, the risks that in combination do the best job of explaining
return and pricing of assets are the market risk, company size risk, and value risk. The
market risk represents the extra risk of stock versus fixed income or the market factor.
(See Appendix A for a mathematical discussion of the overall market risk). The
company size risk represents the amount of risk that the investor faces based on the
size of the company. For example, a small-cap portfolio is expected to have more risk
than a portfolio consisting of large-cap companies . The value risk measures the risk of
stocks with a high BooklMarket Price( value stocks) and stock with low BooklMarket
Price ( growth stocks). As shown in figure 5, the study concluded that portfolios with
a blend of small-cap and value stocks( high BooklMarket Price) have better returns
than other possible portfolios.
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Figure 5.
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The reason why small cap and value stocks are expected to have a better return than
large cap and growth stocks, is directly related to the additional amount of risk taken
by investing in small cap and value stocks. Small cap companies have higher risk
because they are new companies with an unproven track record and small market
share when compared with their competitors. Therefore, in order for investors to take
the additional risk and invest in small cap companies the expected return of such
companies must be much higher. Also, companies with a high BooklMarket Price
(value companies) face more risks than companies with a small BooklMarket Price
(growth companies). The key to understanding the BooklMarket ratio lies in the
denominator, the price that the market is willing to pay for the given stock. High
BooklMarket stocks are lower priced stocks, probably because the stock is a poor
earner and therefore riskier. However, riskier means higher return. In contrast, low
BooklMarket stocks are higher priced stocks, probably because the market expects
these stocks to grow their earnings at higher rates, and therefore these stocks are safer.
Both the Markowitz model and the Fama-French model are used by academics
and practitioners to create efficient portfolio allocations. However, after creating an
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efficient portfolio structure, it is important to fmd an efficient way of managing the
portfolio. Overtime the weighting of the original asset will drift towards the better
performing asset. The resulting portfolio will have a different risk/reward ratio than
the original portfolio. Therefore, how can a manager manage to stay close to the
original goals in a highly dynamic market? In order for a manager to be effective in
managing a given portfolio he/she should develop a strategy, that will facilitate hislher
decisions with regard to asset allocation as well as buy and sell decisions. One such
strategy that can be essential in managing a portfolio is rebalancing.

REBALANCING EXPLAINED
Rebalancing is the process of realigning the investments within a portfolio to
their original allocation targets. Assume that a portfolio is weighted equally between
stocks and bonds, 50% stocks and 50% bonds. Overtime, depending on the
performance of these two assets the weighting of the portfolio is going to shift towards
the better performing asset. Therefore, if stocks outperform bonds by 10%, the new
weighting of the portfolio will be 60% stocks and 40% bonds. This allocation is off
from its original target by 10%. The shift in weighting can be even more dramatic over
long periods of time. For example, over the 65 years ended 1990, a portfolio which
began with 50/50 stock/bond mix in 1926, with stock dividends reinvested in stocks
and coupons reinvested in bonds, would have drifted to a 97/3 mix by 1990(Arnott, 2) .
The shift in allocation of the assets can be problematic because it is no longer
consistent with the original long term risk/reward goals and objectives of the investor.
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Therefore, a portfolio whose weight drifts in favor of stocks, will be exposed to higher
risks and be more vulnerable to a downward market correction in the price of stocks.
The adoption of a rebalancing policy can eliminate this problem by rebalancing
back to the original asset allocation mix. In the previous example a rebalancing of the
portfolio would consist of selling 10% of the stock holdings, and buying 10% more
bonds. Therefore the rebalanced portfolio will now be allocated 50% in stocks and
50% in bonds, which was the original goal. In addition, a rebalancing strategy
provides added benefits. Most notably it enforces a buy low sell high discipline and it
eliminates human emotion when making asset allocation decisions. Even though a buy
low sell high approach is sell evident and very simple to understand, it can actually be
very counter intuitive to implement when human sentiment and emotion is involved in
investment decision making. In bear markets most investors will prefer to sell their
stock positions in order to preserve their wealth. They will keep cash position until the
market starts going back up again. Not wanting to miss out on a bull market, the
investors will invest in a rising market. This scenario illustrates how an investor
bought high and sold low, which could result in a capital loss and a reduction in
expected capital gains.
Rebalancing eliminates human emotion from the decision making process, and it
automatically implements a buy low sell high discipline by selling the outperforming
assets and buying the under performing ones. Therefore, effectively locking in a
capital gain and positioning the portfolio for future upward potential. Some studies
have shown that a rebalanced portfolio will have a higher total geometric mean than
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the same portfolio under a buy and hold strategi. The additional return as the result of
rebalancing is referred to as the rebalancing bonus. This finding contradicts the basic
premise, explained above, that the investor should be rewarded only for the amount of
risk that he is taking. Therefore if an investor is holding the same portfolio of assets,
he should face the same level of risk no matter what strategy he employs in managing
his portfolio. Moreover, it was shown that a buy and hold strategy can expose the
investor to higher levels of risk, whereas rebalancing helps in controlling risk.
Therefore a rebalanced portfolio should have a higher or equal total geometric return
as buy and hold portfolio.
In order to closely inspect the rebalancing bonus it is necessary to develop a
mathematical framework that shows what the expected return on rebalanced portfolio
is and compare it to the total geometric return of a buy and hold strategy. The
following model is created by Cheng and Deets(1971):
A portfolio of m securities is purchased. The original weight on each security is given
by Wi and the weight of all securities add up to l.The time horizon is given by H, and
n gives the number of equal length intervals in horizon H with length from t =

°

to t =

T. In other words, n gives the number of times that the portfolio will be rebalanced.
When the portfolio is rebalanced each security is assigned its initial weight of Wit
where the subscript t denotes the time period t

=

0,1, ... T-l. The portfolio is sold at

time T. This model assumes that each asset is assigned an equal weigh of 11m for all
periods and it does not take into account taxes or trading cost.

See Arnott, Robert & Lovell, Robert. "Rebalancing: Why? When? How Often?", and
Cheng, Pao. "Efficient Portfolio Selections Beyond the Markowitz Frontier".

5
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Given the above assumptions and making use of the mathematical foundations of
portfolio return, which are presented in Appendix A, the total dollar amount of the
portfolio, at time T, for the buy and hold strategy given by:

(1)

For the buy and hold strategy the equation is summing up the total geometric return of

each security over the time period j =l. .. n. The returns from each security are
multiplied by 11m to reflect the weighting of each security as part of the overall
portfolio.
The total dollar amount of the portfolio, at time T, for the rebalanced portfolio is given
by:

(2)

Since the portfolio is being rebalanced every period, it is necessary to add up the
returns of all the securities for each period and then compound the total return of all
securities every time the portfolio is rebalanced for j= Ln. to get the total geometric
return.

In order to compare the expected returns from the two strategies, it is important
to explain that a random walk approach is assumed. From an economist perspective
the random walk theory assumes that markets are efficient and that no investor can
systematically earn a superior return by employing a given investment strategy. This
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assumption can be captured mathematically by assuming that price changes of the
same security from one period to another are independent random variables. As such
no particular investment strategy would be able to consistently predict the price
movements in the market. Therefore since the price changes of the same security are
independent the expected value of the product of the retums of a security i in periods j
and k is equal to the product of the expected retums in each period:
(3)
E(Rij) = ~i ,

where i = 1,2 . . .,m and j

=

(4)

1,2, . . .,n.

Using equation 3 and 4, the expected total geometric return for the two portfolios is:

(5)
(6)

The expected total geometric return of a buy and hold portfolio is given by adding the
compounded excepted retum on each security and mUltiplying it by its weight.
Whereas the expected geometric total retum of a rebalanced portfolio is given by
adding the expected retums of all the securities, multiplying by their respective weight
and then compounding the total return by the number of rebalancing periods.
The difference in total geometric retum for the two strategies can be found by
comparing (5) and (6). Define the difference between the two strategies as:

Sm = E[ GT(BH)] - E[GT(RB)]
Using the above formulas Sm can be written as:
m

S: =~ [2: ll; ] -

(7)

,..,

[~ 2: lllJl1 = (~U) -

(t-t)D
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In

where for BH

(it")

EO :

[Z

p,n ]

1....1

and for RB,

Therefore the difference between the two strategies can be summarized as the
difference between the average of the compounded expected value )l over n periods(
for BH), and the compounded average)l over n periods (for RB). Using (7) it is
possible to conclude the following 6 :
a) The buy and hold strategy will always be superior or at least equal to the
rebalanced portfolio.
b) The more frequently the portfolio

IS

rebalanced the greater the superiority

III

returns of the buy and hold portfolio.
c) The more securities in a randomly selected portfolio the less the superiority of buy
and hold.
It is necessary to empirically test the above model and the conclusions derived from it
and see how well the mathematical model actually holds in practice. Weekly prices for
the 30 stocks composing Dow Jones Industrial were used to test the hypothesis. The
data covered a span of 3 1 years, starting December 31, 1937 to February 21, 1969.
Different periods of length h, given in weeks, were used to test for the effects of the
frequency of rebalancing on total portfolio return. Also, two portfolios of different

6 For a rigorous mathematical proof of the above conclusions see "Portfolio Returns and Random Walk
Theory" by Cheng and Deets.
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SIzes were created, one consisting of 6 securities and the other consisting of 30
securities. The different size portfolios are used to test the third hypothesis which
states that the greater the number of securities in a portfolio the lower the superiority
of buy and hold. The following table shows the results of the testing.
Figure 6.
R ETURN TO BUY-A NO-llow AND REBALA~CING S1"RA1"EGrES UNOER VARYDfG FRE<:rOE_","CIES OP
RERALA~ClNG (n), FOR m
6 A~1) m
10; WITH DEC1Sl0X HOR IZON H
1625 'WEEKS*

=

=

m=6

l'I= n' h
n

h
(weeks)

1625
812
541

1
2
3

406

4
5
6

325
270
232
203
180
162
108
81

54
40
27
18
H

=

7

8
9

10
15
20
30
40
60
90

m= 30
u

GT(BH) #

GT(RD)t

$9.514

$19 .036
13.419

-9.522

9.619

14.640
12.580
10.803
lL437

9.873
9.873
9.619
9.619
9.619
9.619
9.619
9.310
9.619
9.619

-4.768
-2.707
-1.289
-1.818
-1.439

11.862
12.774
10.561
10.164
10.437
10.283
9.940
10.590
9.753

9.873
9.872
9.813
9.514

11.312

So

-3.546

-1.989
-3.155
.942

.545
.818
.664
.630
.971
.1 34

GT(BH) i!

GT(RB)t

$9.5]4
9.873
9.872

$22.756
14.488
15.249
13.399
10.686
11.966

9 .873

9.514
9.619
9 .873

9,87.3
9.619
9.619
9.619
9.619
9.619
9.310
9.619
9.619

11.721
12.488
12 .414
10.305
9.892
10.166
9.922
9.436
10.156
9.356

Sao

-13.242
4.615
5.377
3.526
1.166
2 .347
1.854

2.615
2,795
.686

.273
.547
.303
.126
.537

+

.263

• It is possihle that for some combinations of nand h, the product does not result in eXo-'1ctly
31 years or 1625 weeks. 1"or example, for n
54- and h
30, H is 1620 weeks.
;; G'l'{'uH) under m
6 and m = 30 are identical, since the former represent the arithmetic

=

=

=

=

averages Q{ 5 portfoliO returns each consisting of six dirr~rcnt securities randomly grouped from
the thirty Dow-Jones Industrials.
t When GT(RB) is given for portfolios of sizes less than the full 30 securities, it represents Ute
arithmetic average of the smaller portfolio returns. Hence, wIlen m = 6, GT(RB) is the average
of uvc 6-stock portfolios.

Source: "Portfolio Returns and Random Walk Theory" by Cheng and Deets.

As the data shows neither of the assumptions hold true. First, the buy and hold
strategy is inferior to rebalancing in every single case. A dollar invested equally
among the 30 stocks in 1937 would have been worth $9.514 by 1969. But the same
dollar would have grown to as much as $22.756 under the weekly rebalancing. The
second important observation is the fact that as the frequency of rebalancing increases
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from n=18 to n=1625, the total return of the rebalanced portfolio increases . Therefore,
as the frequency of rebalancing increases so does the total return of the portfolio. This
is contrary to what the mathematical model predicted. The third assumption that BH
superiority will decrease as the portfolio size increases, is partially true. BH
superiority does decrease when the portfolio with 6 stocks is compared to the one with
30 stocks but only when the frequency of rebalancing is large( around once a month).
The discrepancy between the predictions of the theoretical model and the
actual data raises questions about the approach taken and the assumptions that were
made when building the mathematical model. First, no trading cost and tax effects
were taken into account when the total geometric return of rebalancing was
considered. Even though the data presented does not help in calculating transaction
costs and tax effects, it is safe to assume that the rebalancing bonus will be diminished
in the presence of these costs. Second, even a more problematic flaw with the
mathematical model used to calculate the total geometric return of a buy and hold
strategy is that it assumes equal portfolio weighting on each security for every period
of time. Recall that the total geometric return for BH is given by:

This formula assumes that for every period j = 1.. n, the weighting of each particular
stock remains constant at 11m. However this simplifying assumptions, can greatly
impair the total return of a buy and hold portfolio because, as it was shown previously,
overtime the weighting of each stock in the portfolio will drift. The outperforming
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stocks will account for a larger portion of the portfolio, and the underperfonning stock
will

account for

a smaller portion.

Assigning equal weight to

both the

underperfonning and the outperfonning stocks, lowers the overall total return of the
portfolio. Besides the mathematical model, it is necessary to also question the result of
the empirical data. The way the empirical test is perfonned does not allow for use of
econometric testing in detennining the significance of the results. Even though the
data set represents a span of 31 years, it is still important to make use of significance
testing to see whether or not the results are significant.
Other studies have shown mixed results on the issue of rebalancing bonus.
While there seems to be some kind of additional return when rebalancing is employed,
it is not consistent overtime and it is very much dependent on market trends. Arnott &
Lovell, tested different rebalancing techniques to isolate a possible rebalancing bonus.
The rebalancing methods that were tested include calendar rebalancing, rebalancing to
a given range, and threshold rebalancing.
In Calendar Rebalancing the portfolio is rebalanced monthly, quarterly or

annually as decided by the management. This kind of rebalancing is done periodically
and does not make use of any indicators in the market or the volatility of the assets. It
will simply rebalance the portfolio to the original target or range as preferred by the
management.
Rebalancing to Range, recogrnzes that assets will drift from its original
position based on volatility in the market or other factors, and it establishes a range
where the weight of the assets can shift without triggering a rebalancing move. For
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example consider a 50/50 stocklbond allocation with a 5% deviation tolerance from
the original mix. A sale of 1% will occur when stocks reach 56% weight.
Lastly, Threshold Rebalancing incorporates the wisdom of rebalancing to
range with the original allocation mix. It establishes a tolerance range, but when a
rebalancing action is triggered, the rebalancing is done all the way to the original asset
mix. Using the above example, when stocks make up 56% of the portfolio, the
rebalancing process will bring the portfolio back to the 50/50 original mix .The
following data shows how the different rebalancing strategies compare to the drifting
mix portfolio . The data will look at 50/50 stocklbond portfolio for the period 19681991.
Figure 7.

Risk and Reward for Various Rebalandn g Guidel i nes
50/50 Normal Policy Mix (1968-1991 )
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In addition to the already mentioned benefits of rebalancing, a careful examination of

the presented data reveals an additional benefit of rebalancing, the rebalancing bonus.
We can observe the rebalancing bonus in two forms: One in terms of additional return
per unit of risk, as given by the Treynor ratio, and the other in terms of the total return.
As seen from the table every rebalancing strategy has a higher Treynor ratio then the
drifting mix, which means that rebalancing is more effective when expressed in terms
of additional return per unit of risk. The less effective rebalancing strategy,
rebalancing to range 45-55%, has reward/risk ratio of 2.4 units higher than the drifting
mix. Moreover, when we look at absolute returns several rebalancing methods yield a
higher absolute return than the drifting mix. Monthly, quarterly, 49-51 % and all the
threshold rebalancing ranges, yield a better total return than the drifting mix, without
taking into account trading cost.
A similar study by Karen Harris, "Disciplined Rebalancing: Friend or Foe?",
covers the time period 1970-2000 and accounts for transaction cost, shows very
similar results. On a portfolio of 60/40 stock/bond, the reward/risk ratio is higher for
every rebalancing method when compared to the drifting mix. In addition, the
rebalancing method, which uses 125% of standard deviation of returns from its
expected value as the rebalancing range, yields a higher total return than the drifting
mix (Harris, 5). Therefore rebalancing does a better job in maximizing returns while
minimizing risk, and in some cases yielding a higher total return.
However, further analysis reveals that total returns of a rebalanced portfolio
might not always outperform the total return of a drifting mix strategy. In fact
rebalancing, like other portfolio management strategies, will be dependent on the
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market conditions. Figure 5, illustrates how different rebalancing strategies compare to
the drifting mix for the time period 1990-1999.
Figure 8.
Chart 4: RisldReturn of Rebalancing St,-ategies in the 1990s
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The drifting mix outperformed the best rebalancing strategy by 74 basis points. This
data reveals an important observation about rebalancing. Drifting mix will outperform
rebalancing on a sustained market trend, where one of the assets constantly
outperforms the other. This was the case during the nineties where stocks
outperformed bonds. Therefore, during periods with a sustaining upward trend in the
market we would expect a drifting mix strategy to yield higher returns. However,
rebalancing will yield higher returns on a volatile market by locking in additional
capital gains.
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SUMMARY

So far this paper has identified a few important factors that relate to the
expected return and risk of a portfolio . As show by Ibbotson and Kaplan (2000),
among the most important determinants of portfolio return are the asset allocation
decision and the contribution of active management. After deciding the portfolio
policy, given by the asset allocation decision, a manager has the opportunity to
enhance or deteriorate the portfolio return by engaging in security selection and
market timing. French-Fama (1992) showed that it is indeed possible to generate
additional return by engaging in security selection. Their study showed that taking on
additional risk by investing in small-cap and value companies, enhances portfolio
return. Moreover, as shown by Cheng - King (1971), Arnott-Lovell(1992) and a few
other studies presented in this paper, market timing through a rebalancing strategy can
enhance portfolio return.
The aim of this paper is to test these finding using regression analysis and
examining the impact of asset allocation, security selection, and rebalancing on
portfolio returns. The following section, develops a few hypothesis about the expected
impact of the above mentioned factors on total return, while introducing the regression
model and the variables used to test our hypothesis.
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EMPIRICAL SECTION
INTRODUCTION
As shown above, asset allocation, active management, and risk exposure are
key factors in determining portfolio return. The next step of this paper is to create a
model that would quantify and show the impact of each component of total return. The
total return can be expressed as the sum of the return from investment policy and
active management.
TRp

=

Policy + Active Management. Investment Policy is the structure of a portfolio

and it is given by its asset allocation and the weighting of each asset within the
different asset classes. As such the Policy return of a portfolio can be captured using
the return from an index which has similar asset allocation and weighting objectives to
that of the portfolio. Therefore, the index return will serve as the benchmark against
which we can compare the policy return of a portfolio.
Unlike, the Policy return which can be captured usmg an index, Active
Management is composed of a few components and it is therefore harder to measure.
Active Management is defined as the ability of a manager to add additional return by
engaging in security selection (stock picking) and market timing (deciding when to
buy and sell a given security). Therefore Active Management

=

Security Selection +

Market Timing. Security Selection involves decisions such as investing in value vs.
growth companies, or investing in small vs. large cap companies. Whereas, market
timing involves buying low, sell high decisions that could potentially enhance
portfolio return. The regression model will include variables that capture both Policy
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return and Active Management. The objective of the model is to determine the percent
of the total return that is attributable to portfolio policy vs. active management.

REGRESSION MODEL

The regression model will look at the level of total return that is attributable to
the Policy return, and Active Management. Policy return is captured by the return of a
Benchmark (or Index fund) that has similar asset allocation policy as the fund being
examined. The return from Active Management can be attributed to two main factors:
security selection and timing. The portfolio turnover ratio will be used to capture the
effects of timing. The higher the turnover of a Fund the higher the expected return,
keeping everything else constant, because the turnover captures the ability of the
manager to time the market, assuming that the manager would make a timing decision
only if he thinks that it will generate extra return. It is pointless for a manager to make
a timing decision if he thinks that it will deteriorate the total return. However, it is
reasonable to assume that total return is not a linear function of turnover due to the
fact that continuous turnover would imply that total return will go to infinity. But this
level of return is never observed in the market therefore the effects of turnover should
be increasing at a decreasing rate, allowing for a curve linear relationship.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that a manager who makes timing
decisions is likely to develop a strategy that allows him/her to consistently buy low
and sell high. As discussed in this paper, rebalancing is one such strategy that enforces
a buy low, sell high discipline. Therefore, a dummy variable will be created to capture
the effects of rebalancing on return from Active Management. The dummy variable
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7

takes a value of 1 if the fund does rebalance and a value of 0 if it doesn 't. The
purpose of the dummy variable is to detennine whether or not a rebalancing strategy
adds value to the portfolio. We would expect a rebalanced portfolio to have a higher
return than a non-rebalanced one, keeping everything else constant. In addition, as
shown by the Fama-French the PricelBook ratio is a key factor in detennining
portfolio return. Therefore,

the difference between Fund's PricelBook and

Benchmark's PricelBook ratio will be used to detennine the effects of security
selection on Active Management return. The difference in PricelBook ratios shows the
ability of the manager to differentiate the portfolio from its benchmark by selecting
companies that are expected to have returns higher than average. A low PricelBook
ratio is characteristic of value companies, whereas a high PricelBook ratio is
characteristic of growth companies. As French-Fama show, a portfolio that
overweighs value companies is expected to have a higher return than overweighting
growth companies. Therefore, the higher the difference in PricelBook ratio between a
Fund and its Benchmark the lower the total return, keeping everything else constant,
because it shows that the Fund has overweighed growth companies.
Another characteristic of security selection is the risk exposure that the
manager chooses to take by selecting a given group of securities. Therefore, another
way in which the manager can differentiate his fund from its benchmark is by taking
more/less risk than the benchmark. The percent difference between the Fund's beta
and the Benchmark's beta is used to capture the ability of the manager to choose
securities with risk exposure above or below that of the Benchmark. Over the long
run, portfolios with higher risk should be expected to gain a higher return, but in the
7

Later on we explain the criteria used to distinguish a rebalanced portfolio from a non-rebalanced one.
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short run the addition of risk in a given period means that the manager is adding
securities that are out of favor with the market, therefore have a depressed price, and
are likely to result in lower total return.
To complete the regression model, a dummy variable is created to see the
effects on total return from a change in managers during the year. A value of 0 means
that there were no changes in management during the year and a value of 1 means that
there was a change in management. We would expect a change in managers to have a
positive effect on total return, assuming that the new manager is hired because of
his/her ability to generate better return than the previous manager. The regression
model is as follows:
TR =

~o

+

~l(BenchmarkD

+

~2(Funds'

Price/Book j - Benchmark's PricelBook j) +

~3(

Fund Betaj- Benchmark Betaj)/(Benchmark Betaj)+ ~4(TumoverD + ~5(Turnoveri +
~6(Rebalancing

DummyD +

~7(Tenurej)+

tj

where tj is the random error term for the ith fund.

DATA
The data used to test this model was collected from the annual publications of
Morning Star Funds 500. This Morning Star publication provides data on some 500
mutual funds that have performed well on the past and that are expected to perform
above average in the future . Morning Star uses a style matrix to determine the
investment style of the manager. For example a fund that invests in value and small
cap stocks is different from a fund that invests in growth and large cap companies.
Moreover, Morning Star has developed a passive index for each investment style, for

31
example there is a separate index that tracks the performance of large-growth style
funds and a different index for small-value funds. We selected a sample of 50 mutual
funds from different categories and tracked their performance for a period of 7 years.
The data collected included total annual return, beta, Price/Book ratio, turnover,
manager changes during the year, whether the fund is rebalanced or not, and size of
the fund. Also, we collected data for each index corresponding to the investment style
of our funds. The index data included total annual return, beta, and PricelBook ratio.
From this data we calculated two new variables that are needed for the regression
model they are the difference in P/B ratios, and percent difference in beta values
between the fund and that of the corresponding index. The difference in PIB ratios
captures the security selection ability of the manager and how the securities that
compose the fund differ from the securities that compose the index. The percent
difference in the beta values accounts for the risk differential between the fund and its
index. To detem1ine whether or not a fund does use a rebalancing strategy, we
considered the investment style of the manager. If the manager preferred to hold more
than 10% of the portfolio value in cash, or if the manager rebalanced between different
asset classes based on his/her expectations of the future, then we considered the fund
to be rebalanced. The rationale being that the manager needs to have cash in hand in
expectation that he will be able to allocate the cash to assets that will be expected to
perform better than average.
Even though the sample of funds was chosen at random there are a few problems
that arise in this particular data sample. The most important one is that of survival bias. The
funds were chosen from a publication that for the most part reports only the above average
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performing funds. Also, in the span of seven years the coverage of certain funds was
suspended due to poor performance of these funds. Therefore there are years with missing
observations. Moreover, given the fact that the data used to test this model is from the
period 1995-2003, we would expect that the observations from the 1999-2000 period to be
structurally different from the rest of the observations, because of the market bubble that
occurred in during 1999-2000. The extremely high market valuations of the 1999-2000
period would have a direct effect on the Price/Book measure used in our regression model.
Therefore, it might become necessary to split the data in two groups, Non-Bubble period
and Bubble period.
The following are the summary statistics for the Total Return, Benchmark return and
Active Management return:
Variable
Maximum

N

TR

Mean

Median

Std Dev

Minimum

322

13.62

17.15

23.515

- 35.80

321

12.375

19.02

21.79

- 27 . 73

321

1.26

0.84

12.13

-46 . 71

108 . 78

Benchmark
57.51

ActiveManagement
73.73

The average total return of a given fund from our sample data is 13 .62 %, of that
12.375 % is attributable to the benchmark, assuming that the portfolio is tracking the
benchmark one to one. The rest of the return, 1.26 % is attributable to Active
Management. Also, as seen from the standard deviation, the return from the
benchmark is more volatile than the return attributable to Active Management.
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REGRESSION RESULTS

Since managers may hold cash for strategic purposes, or only hold a subset of the index
to we would not expect that there will be a one to one correspondence between the
benchmark and the portfolio.The regression model yielded will account for these
movements and will assess the effectiveness of the manager's decisions. The results of the
model is given in table 9:
Figure 9.
Regression Results

I Entire Period
Variable

8

Intercept
Benchmark
Diff PB
Beta
Turnover
TurnSqr
Rebalance
Tenure
F-value
R-Square
N
(observations)

Coefficient
-0. 10542
0.93519
0.47442
-4 .3 9303
0.07947
-0.000328
-0 .80927
-4 .05151
120.92
0.7400
300 1

I Pre-Bubble Period
Pr >Itl
0.9527
<.0001
0.3260
0.1604
0.0392
0.0441
0.6034
0.0510
<. 0001
----

----

I Bubble Period

Pr >Itl
0.0979
<. 0001
0.5353
0.0751
0.2054
0.3 377
0.5467
0.0195
<.0001

Coefficient
5.66987
0.73960
0.49511
7.9003
0.04804
-0.000142
-1.10763
-5.76706
10.48
0.43
105

----

----

1

1Post-Bubble Period

Pr >Itl
0.7950
<. 0001
0.7674
0.5424
0.4397
0.4739
0.8952
0.5007
<. 0001

Coefficient
-1.76263
0.96989
0.31087
-6.76616
0.12808
-0.000563
-0.70658
-4.94097
9.86
0.49
79

-- --

----

Coefficient
-1.16465
0.93854
-0.09012
-10 .152
0.12297
-0.00067
-0.62870
-3 .39906
185.33
0.9238
1141

1

As seen from the F- statIstIc the EntIre Penod regressIOn model IS sigruficant and It
can explain about 74% of the variation in total annual return. However, a closer look
at the independent variables shows that only the benchmark, turnover, tumoversqr,
and tenure are statistically significant, at a 95% level of confidence. The benchmark
has a coefficient of 0.93 suggesting that for every 1% increase in the benchmark
return, the total fund return increases by 0.93%. Both turnover and turnover square

Originally we had intended to include another variable that would account for the possible size effects
ofa fund's total assets on the fund's total annual return. However, we weren't able to get the necessary
data for the size effect.

8

Pr >Itl
0.4852
<. 0001
0.9151
0.0002
0.0018
0.0002
0.6536
0.0802
<.000 1
----

----
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are statistically significant and as expected, the turnover has a positive coefficient,
while turnover square has a negative coefficient. This suggests that the positive effects
of additional turnover are increasing at a decreasing rate, and that eventually increased
turnover has negative effects on portfolio return. Further mathematical analysis shows
that the optimal level of turnover is at around 120%, implying that a portfolio will
have the highest level of return when the turnover is at 120%, keeping everything else
constant9 . A turnover of 120% generates on average a total return of 4.76%, keeping
everything else constant. Even though, our regression model did not account for
transaction costs or tax implications, associated with turnover, a return of 4.76%
would more than offset the above costs 10. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that
turnover does increase total after cost return of a portfolio.
The variable Tenure is statistically significant at a confidence level of 95%.
However, contrary to what was predicted it has a negative impact on total portfolio
return. The evidence suggests that if there was a change in managers during the year
the total portfolio return would diminish by 4.05%, keeping everything else constant.
This fact has two possible explanations. The first reason might be that the diminished
total return is not due to the new manager, but is largely due to the previous manager,
who presumably was not able to achieve a required rate of return. It is this poor
performance that ultimately leads to change in managers. Therefore, the poor results
of the first manager would be reflected upon the new manager, at least during his first
year. The second explanation might be that the new manager has not had enough time

9

To find the optimal level oftumover we maximized the regression function using partial derivatives.
Most mutual funds charge fees that range from 0.18% to 2% of assets under management.

10
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to test his security selection and timing ideas and therefore it is expected, on average,
to diminish the total annual return during his first year.
An examination of the t-values shows that the other variables are not

statistically significant and therefore the coefficient estimate is unreliable. This result
is particularly surprising in the case of the PricelBook ratio because as shown in this
paper, previous studies have found this variable to be significant and play an important
role in explaining variation in total return. The fact that the Price/Book ratio is not
significant might be due to a probable structural change in data during the market
bubble period of 1999-2000. To test if this is the case the data is separated in three
groups; Pre-Bubble period, Bubble period, and Post-Bubble period. The same
regression model is tested using the separate data sets and a Chow test is performed to
determine if the data sets are significantly different.
As shown in the regression table, the F- statistics show that the regression
models are significant in all three periods. However, the statistical significance of
most of the variables is pretty volatile, with Benchmark being the only variable that is
consistently significant at a level of 99.99% confidence. Moreover, the explanatory
power of the regression model varies from a low R-square of 43% for the Pre-Bubble
period to a high of 92% for the Non-Bubble period. This results implies that the model
is able to explain 43% of the variation in retunlS during the Pre-Bubble period, and
about 92% of the variation in returns during the Post-Bubble period.
To determine whether the data from the three periods are structurally different
we performed a Chow test. This test showed that we could not reject the null
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hypothesis that the data are structurally similar! !. Therefore, there appears to be no
structural breaks and the results given by the Entire Period regression model are the
most reliable ones. Given the fact that the statistical significance of the variables used
was pretty volatile throughout the three periods, a few other statistical tests are
necessary to ensure that the volatility of the variables is not due to problems with the
data.

More

specifically we

tested

for

the

presence

of serial

correlation,

heteroskedasticity, and multicollinearity in the regression model.
Since the data is both cross-sectional and time series it is possible that presence
of serial correlation could account for some of the error term from one period to the
other and thus create bias in the coefficient estimates. To check for the presence of
serial correlation we performed a Durbin-Watson test and got a value of 2.32. Because
this value is approximately 2, then it is safe to assume that our data does not exhibit
any form of serial correlation. Moreover, the Chi-square test showed a value Chi of
32.01 and Pr > Chi of 0.157, therefore heteroskedasticity is not a major problem with
our data. Also, a variance inflation test showed that multicollinearity is not present in
the model. Therefore we can conclude that the statistical results presented were not
affected by serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, or multicollinearity in the model.
In addition, we tested to see if a given investment style would be superior in

explaining variation in total return. We added to the regression model nine dummy
variables, corresponding to the nine different investment styles!2 tracked by the
Morningstar Funds 500 publication. The analysis showed that none of the styles were

The F-value = 0.2717 and Fcrit =2.64, therefore F-value < Fcrit and fail to reject the null hypothesis
The Investment styles tracked by Morningstar are: largecap-value, large cap-core, largecap-growth,
smallcap-value, smallcap-core, smallcap-growth, rnidcap-value, rnidcap-core, madcap-growth.
II
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statistically significant, in explaining variation in total return. Therefore, none of the
investment styles help explain the variation in total return for our sample data.

THE PORTION OF RETURN EXPLAINED BY PORTFOLIO POLICY &
ACTIVE MANAGEMENT

The above regression models have helped clarify the effects of the benchmark, PIB
ratio, beta value, turnover, rebalancing, and tenure on the total return of a fund.
However, these regression models have not addressed the question of what percent of
the total return is explained by the benchmark (portfolio policy) vs. active
management? To answer this question we performed a different kind of analysis. First,
to address the question of what percent of a funds total return is explained by its
benchmark, we calculated an expected total return for a portfolio based on the
benchmark coefficient obtained by the regression model.
Therefore, E[TR]= -0.10542 + 0.93519

* Benchmark.

Then we calculated an R-square statistic to determine the percent of variation in total
return that is explained, by the variation of the benchmark.
II

I

(E(TR) -TR)2

R-square =....:...1=....:...1_ _ _ __
II

I(TR-TR) 2
i=1

This analysis shows an R-square of around 0.734, suggesting that 73.4% of the
variation in total return of a given fund is explained by its benchmark.
Once the benchmark( the policy) for a portfolio has been determined it is
interesting to find out the contribution of active management to the total return, in
addition to that of the benchmark. A similar analysis like above shows that after the
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benchmark has been set, Active Management (as defined by the variables used in the
Whole Period regression model) explains around 1.27% of the variation in total return.
This finding is rather surprising because it suggests that once the portfolio policy (the
benchmark) has been determined, on average, Active Management will explain only
1.27% of the variation in total return of the fund . The Active Management
contribution is almost zero if we were to account for management fees, and tax costs
related to portfolio management. However, it is important to point out that the WholePeriod regression model explained about 74% of the variation in total return, which
means that around 26% of the variation of return could not be explained by our model.
Obviously, the unexplained portion cannot be attributed to the portfolio policy (the
benchmark) because the benchmark was one of the variables in the model. Therefore
by the definition of the total return l3 , the unexplained portion of the variation has to be
attributed to either Active Management or to random error. However, it is next to
impossible to assume that a portfolio manager would accept the notion that 26% of the
variation of a portfolio's total return is due to random error. A manager would rather
cite his superior abilities and even instinct as the main reason for the generated return.
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the unexplained portion of the total return is due to
Active Management and that our model has left out other variables that could
contribute in explaining Active Management.
To test whether the additional return from active management is pure random
error and therefore not attributable to the manager, we performed further analysis. We
calculated the fund residuals as :
RESIDit = TRit - E(TRit)
13

TR= Benclunark + Active Management
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where TRi is the return of fund I, and E(TRi) is the expected fund return due to
portfolio policy. The model assumes that the residuals are normally distributed with a
mean of o. We find the mean residual for fund i and calculated a t-value for the each
of the funds. 14 The t value that we calculated represents the number of Standard
Deviations the fund's mean is from O. The t-critical is 1.96 for 95% level of
confidence. Thus, for any t value over 1.95 we are 95% confident that the return from
Active Management is not due to random error. Thus, a t value of +2. 5 means the
residual mean exceeds zero by 2.5 standard deviations, and there is less than a 5%
chance that it could be zero. This result indicates that Active Management added
additional return to the established benchmark. Likewise, a -2.5 t value means the
residual mean fell below zero by 2.5 standard deviations, and there is less than a 5%
chance that it could be zero. This result indicates that Active Management had a
negative impact on the fund's total return.
We screened our sample of mutual funds to determine the ones whose Active
Management return is attributable to the manager and not to random error. Out of 56
mutual funds, 19 have the portion of Active Management attributable to their
managers' skills, and 37 funds have the return from Active Management attributable
to random error. Table 10 gives a summary of the top 5 positive performers and the 4
negative Active Management performers from the

19 funds whose Active

Management return is attributable to managers' skills. IS

14
15

The standard deviation used in the t test is a weighted by the sample size.
The ten remaining funds had residual returns between 0 and 3.19.
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Table 10
Top Active Management Performance
Fund Name
Mean Residual
OPPENH . QUEST VALUE A
7.5
VANGUARD WINDSOR
7.29
FIDELITY LOW PRICE STOCK
4.52
4.07
NEUBERGBERMAN GUARDIAN
T.ROW NEW AMERICA GROWTH
3.19
Worst Active Management Performance
VANGUARD US GROWTH
-7 .64
KAUFMANN
-5 .11
COLUMBIA GROWTH
-3.49
OPPENH . MAIN ST A
-3 .36

t-value
10.4
3.16
1.99
2.01
2.05
-2 .05
-2 .65
-2.28
-2 .12

As the table shows there are certain managers whose superior ability generates above
average returns. Also, there are managers who deteriorate the performance of their
funds by engaging in active management.

Conclusion
This paper has identified two important factors that a manager needs to address
in creating and managing a portfolio . The first is the establishment of the structure of
the portfolio or the portfolio policy, what asset classes it holds and in what
proportions. The structure of the portfolio is the main factor that shows how a
portfolio is exposed to risk, and it accounts for 73.4% of the variation in total return of
a portfolio . The second important factor is the strategy employed by the manager to
manage the portfolio. Our results show that the effects of active management on total
return are limited for the sample of funds during the period 1995-2003, with active
management, as defined by the variables used, accounting for only 1.27 % of the
variation in total return. However, as pointed out in this paper, it is plausible that the
unexplained portion( 26%) of the variation in total return is due to omitted variables
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that could explain Active Management. Moreover, our analysis showed that certain
managers can enhance the total return of a fund by engaging in Active Management.
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Appendix A.

WHY HOLD A PORTFOLIO? IT'S THEORY AND MATHEMATICS.
In order to develop a framework for portfolio return and risk we need to first define
the return and risk of individual assets. The expected return of an asset i is given by
the following formula:
(1)

/I

E(R)=:.Ri = I p ij* Rij
p I

Where Pij represents the probability of the jth return on the ith asset. Pij gives the
occurrence of a given return, the sum of the individual returns adjusted by their
probability of occurring will give the expected return of the particular asset. The risk
of an individual asset can be captured by using its deviation from the expected return.
Since the deviation form the expected return can be negative as well as positive, it. is
necessary to use the square of the deviation so that the differences between the
negative and positive deviations do not offset each other and result in a zero sum
vanance.
/I

Therefore the variance of asset i is given by:

2
(J

= L..)Pij(Rij - -Ri)] 2
'"

(2)

j= 1

Since a measure of risk and return for individual assets is defined, it is possible to
express the expected risk and return of a portfolio of assets. Assuming that X
represents the weight of the asset in the portfolio, the expected return of a portfolio
consisting of n assets can be derived as follows :

(3)

This equation can be rewritten as
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(4)
i: J

i: J

and therefore the expected return of a portfolio of assets is given by
-

1/

Rp= IXRi

(5)

i: J

Similarly it can be shown that the variation

In

a two asset portfolio

IS

gIVen by
(6)

where

0"1 2 gives

the covariance between the two assets. In a more general portfolio of

N assets the variance can be given by:
N

cr/ =

I

i:J

N

2

(X cr? )+

N

I I

(XXkGik)

(7)

i:J k: J

The first part of this equation is the sum of the weighted variances of the individual
assets and the second part is the covariance between the individual assets. Equation (7)
highlights the two most important ideas behind portfolio management. First, while the
expected return of a portfolio is the weighted average return of the individual assets,
the risk of the portfolio is not simply measured by the weighted average risk of each
asset. The risk of the portfolio is also a function of the covariance between the assets
of a portfolio . The risk of the portfolio is also a function of the covariance between the
assets of a portfolio. If the correlation is positive the variance will be large and if the
correlation is negative the variance will be small. Second, by modifying the above
equation it is possible to completely eliminate any risks that are particular to a given
asset.
Assume that equal amount of money is invested in N assets. The formula for the
variance can be written as:
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2 N 1 22 N N 1 1
(Jp = L (-) (J, + LL(- )(- )(Jlk )
;=1 N
;=1 k= 1 N
N

(8)

Further mathematical simplifications will yield the following formula for the variance:

1-

2

(Jp

= - (J

N

2

N - 1,+--cr,k

(9)

N

If we take the limit of the above expression as N approaches infinity we observe that
the risk of the individual assets can be diversified away ( it approaches zero), but the
risk caused by the covariance terms cannot be diversified ( it approaches (J;k ).
Therefore the risk faced by investors has in fact two components the unsystematic risk
or the risk related to the individual asset as shown in the first part of the equation (9),
and the systematic risk or the market risk, as shown in the second part of the equation
(9). As shown above the systematic risk cannot be diversified away, but the
unsystematic risk can. A graphical representation to illustrate this finding is presented
below.
Figure 1.

\o nsy:; C'nmlic ri" k

-----.:. .:. .:. :. .:. .::==~~~
Nu mber of securities
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This finding when combined with the idea that there is a certain amount of reward for
bearing risk, leads to a very important conclusion: "The expected return on an asset
should depend only on that asset's systematic risk"( Ross, 397). Therefore, for
investors systematic risk is the relevant risk as long as they hold a portfolio. The
unsystematic risk can be diversified away and therefore it should not have a risk
premium associated with it.
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